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14. ABSTRACT With the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the US-Soviet struggle that provided support for marginally governed states, there has been an explosion of state fragmentations and failures across the globe. Given these conditions, it is highly likely that the U.S. military and non-governmental organizations will find themselves working in closer proximity than ever before, while responding to humanitarian emergencies and post-conflict operations. Though the military and NGOs have a long history of working under harsh conditions and even in the same remote and dangerous locations, the two groups have traditionally tried to avoid collaborative efforts, both believing that their work was essentially incompatible. Given the likelihood that the military will be working with NGOs more frequently and far into the future, its operational level leadership would benefit by learning to better understand how broadly its organization differs from NGOs and take steps needed to bridge the cultural gap that separates them, in order to achieve common goals.						
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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**The U.S. Military and NGO Relationship During Post-Conflict
Humanitarian Emergency Operations: How Can the U.S. Military
Improve It?**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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Abstract

With the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the US-Soviet struggle that provided support for marginally governed states, there has been an explosion of state fragmentations and failures across the globe. Given these conditions, it is highly likely that the U.S. military and non-governmental organizations will find themselves working in closer proximity than ever before, while responding to humanitarian emergencies and post-conflict operations.

Though the military and NGOs have a long history of working under harsh conditions and even in the same remote and dangerous locations, the two groups have traditionally tried to avoid collaborative efforts, both believing that their work was essentially incompatible. Given the likelihood that the military will be working with NGOs more frequently and far into the future, its operational level leadership would benefit by learning to better understand how broadly its organization differs from NGOs and take steps needed to bridge the cultural gap that separates them, in order to achieve common goals.

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The U.S. Military and NGO Relationship During Complex Humanitarian Emergencies and Post Conflict Operations: How Can the U.S. Military Improve It?

For the near future our military is more likely to participate in humanitarian interventions...than it is to participate in a war or peace enforcement¹

I. Introduction

With the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the US-Soviet struggle that provided support for marginally governed states, there has been an explosion of state fragmentations and failures across the globe. Recent events in states like Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan are all good examples of the kind of chaos that can ensue when governments lose control of events within their borders. Given the number of humanitarian emergencies that tend to follow conflicts in fragmented or failed states, it is highly likely that the U.S. military (hereafter “military”) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will frequently find themselves working in ever-closer proximity while responding to humanitarian emergencies and post-conflict operations.

Though the military and NGOs have a long history of working under harsh conditions and even in the same remote and dangerous locations, the two groups have traditionally tried to avoid collaborative efforts, both believing that their work was essentially incompatible. Just as NGOs have traditionally preferred to work independently from the military for fear of being associated with belligerent parties and subsequently losing the impartiality they need to perform humanitarian work, the military has preferred to not be involved in either complex humanitarian emergencies or post-

¹ Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 1999), 18.

conflict operations, believing that their most important mission was war-fighting and that humanitarian response should be left to NGOs. While their reasoning for independence has traditionally made sense, the world has changed significantly and there is every indication that the failure or fragmentation of states will continue unabated. Given the likelihood that the military will be working around and with NGOs far into the future, its leadership must learn to understand how their organization differs from NGOs and take steps needed to bridge the wide cultural gap that separates them. Maintaining independence from NGOs is no longer a reasonable course of action, nor simply even possible.

II. The difference between NGO and military organizational structures

First and foremost, NGOs are private, non-profit organizations which attempt to dissociate themselves from governments whenever possible. Some NGOs may be indigenous to the countries that they work in; others are international and may operate in many countries all over the world. Although the size and universe of NGOs are far too big to describe here (for example, there are more than a thousand NGOs of various size presently working in Afghanistan²) certain generalizations can be made about mainstream, well-established humanitarian NGOs. They tend to provide one of four types of services: humanitarian assistance (i.e. CARE International), human rights advocacy (Amnesty International), conflict resolution (The Carter Center) or societal development (National Endowment for Democracy).

² Monroe, Trevor, (State Department Reconstruction Officer in Kabul for two years), interview by author, 28 March 2006, conversation.

The differences between NGOs and military organizations are numerous and startling. In fact, at first-blush they could lead one to believe that it is simply not possible that these organizations could work together, especially under war-time conditions. The differences between these organizations can be broken down into five major categories: (1) governmental relationships, (2) organizational hierarchy, (3) training and doctrine, (4) financial resources (5) use of indigenous resources.

While many NGOs share a variety of common values, those which respond to humanitarian emergencies feel that their cornerstone is to maintain *impartiality* and *independence*. Remaining *impartial* has traditionally been very important to most NGOs. They typically provide humanitarian aid to anyone in need, regardless of their race, creed or national origin.

Remaining *independent* is very important to NGOs as well. In order to provide aid, humanitarian organizations must be able to cross “lines of conflict” at will. Besides being non-partisan, they also believe they must be viewed as being apolitical. If they were to receive direction or take orders from military or governmental organizations, they could be perceived to be a threat to belligerent parties involved in a conflict. This could endanger the people that the NGO is trying to help or the staff members of its own organization. In this sense, many NGOs feel they must remain independent as a means of maintaining a degree of collective security among the family of NGOs. On the other hand, the military’s sole responsibility is to carry out the will of the US government and is therefore, by its very nature, both a partisan and political organization.

Most NGOs have narrowly defined mission statements and exercise a great deal of care to operate within their mandate. While many naturally want to please the donors

which support their organizations, many will not accept money from donors that attempt to exert undue influence on its operations or request they operate outside of their mandate. In comparison, the military has a wide range of missions and could be called upon to perform any one of them at anytime or place. The perspective of the organizations' leadership is therefore completely different.

NGOs typically have flat hierarchies and decentralized organizations which have the effect of providing significant power to people at lower levels in the organization and staff who work in the field. This flat hierarchical structure is particularly important since many NGOs also tend to have small staffs that need to respond to emergency situations with limited guidance or communication from distant home offices. On the other hand, military organizations have multi-tiered hierarchies; the chain of command must be rigidly adhered to as a matter of policy

NGO training and doctrine are also fundamentally different from the military's. Most NGOs operate with very little doctrine because of their size and nature of work. This allows field staff a great deal of flexibility in terms of how they choose to respond to emergency situations, what resources they will use and how they interact with local populations and governments. They also tend to rely on "on the job training" due to their relatively small staff size. In contrast, the military tends to rely on a vast network of operating doctrine and they train constantly for conflict situations that they may face.

The financial resources of NGOs are vastly different from the military's as well. Most NGOs tend to have very limited funding available and therefore need to spend what little they have with great care. Operating "in the red" with the idea that funds can be somehow reallocated within the organization after the fact is rarely an acceptable

practice. Having to raise money is an activity that even NGO field staff normally need to be concerned with, particularly if they are working for or in the vicinity of large inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), like the United Nations or governmental aid organizations like USAID, since they may also be prospective donors. Also, since an NGO's success is often judged by its ability to minimize overhead costs, they may choose to focus carefully on increasing operating efficiencies, in a way that would not be reasonable for an organization like the military, which has a \$500 billion annual budget.

In comparison to NGOs, the military's budget appears to be limitless. For instance, in responding to national military emergencies it is common practice for military personnel (and their civilian counterparts) to do "whatever it takes" in order to accomplish a mission. It is typically assumed that reallocation of funds can be accomplished to make up for short falls and that financial problems can be resolved at a later date. Most pay little attention to short-term financial issues in these types of situations.

Many NGO employees in the field normally have a very wide range of responsibilities besides their professional specialty. Often working alone or in small groups with only host-country nationals, they may also have to take on any other duties imaginable including accountant, logistician, contracting officer, administrator, translator, negotiator, payroll manager, communications technician or truck driver. While NGO employees may be highly educated in a particular field, the nature of their work dictates that they be highly flexible.

The motivations for the military or NGOs to respond to a crisis are very different. For instance, a decision by the national command authority to have the military engage in

humanitarian operations is often driven by US national interests. Even though there are dozens of humanitarian disasters occurring around the world at any given time, national leadership only chooses to respond to the most devastating emergencies in parts of the world where we have important national interests or media coverage served to galvanize public concerns. On the other hand, large humanitarian relief organizations respond to emergencies across the globe as a matter of policy. Since NGOs are non-governmental by their very nature, they have no national interests to serve and can respond to any humanitarian emergency they choose. For instance, Save the Children is presently operating in more than 100 countries simultaneously.

III. Why should the military work more closely with NGOs?

There are important reasons why the military should work closely with NGOs during humanitarian relief operations: (1) NGOs are experts in this area and can provide the military with advice about resources needed to ameliorate human suffering in the short term, (2) the organizations can work together to deconflict operations when non-permissive environments exist and (3) the military can take advantage of the extensive local knowledge that NGOs normally have.

The military is normally involved with humanitarian relief or post-conflict operations only until the most devastating conditions are addressed. On the other hand, NGOs tend to view societal development as a natural extension of humanitarian relief operations. For this reason NGOs may plan on continuing operations in a country for a decade or more after their initial response. Unless the military and NGOs work together during the period of initial response, it's possible that conditions in the country could deteriorate after the military redeploys. In fact "it is beyond the realm of military forces

[alone] to change the nature of a country and implement a new tradition.”³ This being the case, the military must rely on NGOs in order to provide assistance in taking over long-term relief efforts.

There are practical reasons that the military should work closely with NGOs. Humanitarian emergencies are often preceded by or continue through military operations which may occur in the same areas as the NGOs are working. In order to insure that NGOs aren’t accidentally attacked or otherwise interfere with ongoing military operations, it is highly desirable for the military and NGOs to deconflict their operations. Besides the obvious benefits to NGOs of avoiding military operations, it also helps them create enough space between them and the military so their actions do not become blurred in the eyes of belligerents. In this case deconflicting operations serves the interests of both organizations.

NGOs operating in a particular country may be either indigenous or foreign. Indigenous NGOs will of course understand its country’s culture by their very nature and should always be consulted when possible. However, the staff of foreign NGOs may also have many years of experience working in a single country and may develop a different cultural perspective that is also useful for the military when planning and executing responses to CHE. Some will have learned to speak the local language and will have also have become culturally fluent. It’s likely that they also will have grown to understand how a country’s businesses and governments operate, how its transportation systems work and how to transact business in an efficient manner. They may also have developed

³ Holgrafe, J.L. and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

a broad range of contacts that can be trusted to provide the kind of sound advice or assistance that is particularly important in countries where personal relationships are needed to get things done.⁴

IV. Why do many NGOs not want to work more closely with the military?

There are many reasons why some NGOs may prefer not to work with the military in responding to humanitarian emergency or post-conflict operations.

As discussed previously NGOs must remain apolitical in order to successfully perform their work. Their ability to accomplish their mission relies on them being seen as impartial and independent at all times. Failure to remain impartial could cause them to lose the support of the people within their area of operations or the government of the country that they are working in. Naturally, any government can refuse an NGO permission to operate within its country or eject them if it believes an NGO is attempting to further its own political agenda or cause political instability.

Because the military is an organization that is political by its very nature, its mission is to carry out policies set by the government's leadership. Even though the military may engage in operations where they are able to save thousands of lives, it's not possible for them to disassociate themselves from the US government's political agenda.

Many NGOs prefer not to operate with the military except under highly unusual conditions. While some NGOs have guidelines which dictate the circumstances when they can receive assistance from the military, others have no guidelines at all and simply

⁴ Author's observation while working in Yemen Arab Republic as a Peace Corps Volunteer and USAID consultant from 1985 to 1988 and World Bank consultant in 1992, and also while working in Bahrain from 1994-2000 as a Navy civilian who worked with a wide variety of contractors, foreign militaries and government agencies throughout the Arabian Gulf

make the decision on a case-by-case basis. Other NGOs refuse to associate themselves with any inherently political organization under any circumstances.

In the past the military has been successful in responding to CHE in areas where there are also ongoing combat operations. Using Commander's Emergency Response (CERP) funds, projects are often undertaken directly with the local populace, in concert with the Army Corps of Engineers and USAID, in an attempt to win the "hearts and minds" of citizens. Since 2001, more than \$126 million in CERP funds have been expended in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵ While the military should of course be lauded for their noble efforts in undertaking CERP projects, they can present NGOs with serious challenges. Since the military sometimes undertakes projects in order to enhance military operations in the same areas that NGOs are themselves working, it can be difficult for local populations to perceive the differences between the military and NGOs. Once this happens NGOs may lose their neutrality and become subject to attacks by belligerents. While many NGOs expressed concerns about "hearts and minds" projects since returning to Afghanistan in 2002, they were largely ignored until 2004 when five Doctors Without Borders staff members were killed by insurgents and the organization withdrew from Afghanistan entirely.⁶

⁵ <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040114-1144.html>. (accessed May 12, 2006).

⁶ Save The Children UK, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan* (London: Save The Children UK, 2004), 4.

V. Analysis

Without question, the US –led coalition forces and the international humanitarian assistance community share the common goal of assisting the Afghan people achieve a long-awaited, stable and prosperous peace. The PRTs can be an important part of that effort without compromising...the humanitarian community...⁷

While many NGOs may generally prefer not to work with the military, there are umbrella groups like “InterAction” and “The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response” who represent consortiums of more than 100 major NGOs. These umbrella organizations recognize that the world has changed. They are aware that an increased number of insurgencies and terrorist groups in failed or fragmented states have become a permanent part of the humanitarian relief and post-conflict response landscape and are taking steps to draw the military and NGOs closer together in an attempt to find common ground.⁸ One of the major NGOs they represent is CARE, who states in their web site:

“It has always been evident that conflict has a negative effect on development... Development work can also contribute to war, can miss potential opportunities for building peace, and can be a waste of resources if conflict is not addressed.”⁹

CARE clearly realizes that conflict may impact their work negatively and that it needs to be resolved in order for them to carry out their work in an efficient manner. The military

⁷ Borders, Robert, USA, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development," *Journal of Development and Social Transformation* (unknown:unknown): 10.

⁸ InterAction, *Civil-Military Relations: Working with NGOs* (Washington DC: National Defense University, unknown) [CD-ROM].

⁹ Care International, 2006, "Conflict And Peace," <http://careinternational.org.uk/conflict+and+peace+88.twl/> (accessed April 24, 2006).

would benefit by helping organizations like CARE craft strategies to help them resolve conflicts that may hamper their operations.

The development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan was proposed by Coalition Forces in mid-2002 as a means to provide governmental relief and development organizations, like USAID and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), with a security detachment that allowed them to operate in remote, unsecured areas of the country where they could not travel to on their own. Since that time 23 PRTs have been formed and are operating throughout Afghanistan.

Some NGOs openly acknowledge that PRT activities in Afghanistan are assisting their activities¹⁰. They've acknowledged that PRTs operating in dangerous areas tend to provide them with a degree of "ambient security" simply by their presence. Some NGOs are taking advantage of this situation whenever possible.

The PRT concept may also be one way that the military can directly assist NGOs in carrying out relief and post-conflict operations in situations that are non-permissive. PRTs are presently composed of US government development agencies and Government of Afghanistan representatives, as well as military security personnel, but do not include NGOs. Military leadership at the Joint Civilian Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) and Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) should continue to work with NGO groups to develop "mixed breed PRTs" which include NGOs. While this may not now be possible, if the security situation in Afghanistan were to significantly deteriorate, NGOs might be more inclined to see this as a viable way of operating.

¹⁰ *NGO Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance* (Toronto: Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee), 12

Some NGOs realize that their traditional views about maintaining neutrality may have to be modified. In cases where they are unable to distinguish post-war insurgents from people who legitimately need aid, they could actually be exacerbating the levels of violence, if they are unknowingly providing assistance to insurgents or belligerents who are not recognizable to them as such.

While the military chose to exclude all NGOs (as well as nearly all USG civilian agencies) from post-conflict operations in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE, just two years later during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq, the military and NGOs coordinated their activities with a great degree of success. Rudd even argues that “military leadership [during PROVIDE COMFORT] proved crucial during the humanitarian operation when...NGOs lacked not only organization cohesion but effective coordination.”¹¹ However, just two years later during the planning phase for Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, there was almost no contact between the military and NGOs that had ongoing operations in Somalia. When the Marines went ashore there in December 1992, all they had was a list of NGO’s that were operating in the area.¹² Nearly ten years later, following Operation ENDURING FREEDOM post-conflict planning with NGO coordinating groups, it took nearly an entire year to develop security plans that adequately allowed the NGOs and military personnel to coordinate activities, even in the most basic way. Based on the inconsistent coordination of previous military-NGO relationships, it’s clear that the military (as well as NGOs) must work

¹¹ Holgraffe, 81

¹² Swindle, 3.

towards institutionalizing a system that provides for better communication between the groups at both the operational and theater-strategic levels.

VI. Ways in which the military can change to work more effectively with NGO's

Senior military leaders have developed an instinctive sense that the civil-military relationship is a critical one and that planning and resourcing the post-conflict phase should start almost immediately. However, majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels... are uncomfortable with CMO issues and are otherwise consumed with the immediate fight.¹³

Developing better working relationships with NGOs will be a challenge for the military to accomplish but the benefits of doing so could bring significant gains to both parties, not to mention the recipients of the aid being distributed or projects being undertaken.

First, military leadership having significant interaction with NGOs in Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Forces (CJCMOTFs) and Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs), need to clearly understand the broad cultural differences between the military and NGO organizations, as discussed herein. An appreciation and understanding of an NGO's small budgets, limited doctrine and small, but empowered, flexible staff will allow for improved relationships when planning, negotiating or deconflicting ongoing operations. Simply put, it is important that CJCMOTF and CMOC personnel attempt to "put themselves in the shoes" of NGO staff when dealing with them (and vice versa.) While the military's doctrinaire environment and rigid, hierarchical structure is not in any way easy to reconcile with the kind of unplanned, loose operating style that many NGOs

¹³ Fields, Kimberly, Major, USA "Civil-Military Relations: A Military-Civil Affairs Perspective" (Cambridge: JF Kennedy School of Government, unpublished), http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use%20of%20Force/October%202002/Field_final.pdf

prefer, it is likely that understanding of each other's situations could lead improved ability to coordinate activities and work more closely together

Some NGO personnel have complained that the relatively short tours of both military and State personnel have prevented the development of better relations between the organizations. Military leaders directly involved in humanitarian assistance projects should lengthen (or shorten) tours in order to better synchronize their activities with State and AID personnel who may be working on the same projects. At a minimum, the military should insure that gapping of CMOC leadership billets is minimized and that there is sufficient time allowed for in-country turnover of senior personnel. Particularly during humanitarian relief operations, when personal relationships among interagency leadership is extremely important, all "corporate knowledge" may be lost if face-to-face turnovers don't occur. (The Navy's tradition of changing commands in as little as 12 hours would definitely not facilitate this process.) This is particularly important since NGO personnel typically remain deployed for 3 to 5 year periods and develop extensive knowledge of host-country language(s), culture, business practices, and societal norms, all of which could be useful to CMOC personnel.¹⁴

The military should coordinate with the State Department to implement the directives made in National Security Personnel Directive (NSPD) 44 (dated December 7, 2005) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 (dated November 28, 2005) as related to military-NGO interaction including: (1) coordinating planning, training and exercising of stability operations with NGOs and sharing information about related

¹⁴ Monroe, Trevor, (State Department Reconstruction Officer in Kabul for two years), interview by author, 28 March 2006, conversation.

operations, whenever appropriate and (2) having military personnel undertake tours of duty with NGOs and develop opportunities for NGOs to participate in DoD training programs related to stability operations. Additionally, since the Naval War College is the leading DoD institution in the field of professional military education, perhaps it should consider inviting personnel from NGO coordinating agencies, like InterAction or ReliefWeb, to speak at JMO lectures or seminars, or even invite NGO personnel, especially those with extensive military backgrounds, to take part in JMO capstone exercises.

The military should take all steps to insure that CMOC personnel never attempt to use NGO personnel as sources of intelligence. Using them in this way has been suggested by Swindle¹⁵ and it is not hard to understand why; many NGO staffs may have developed extensive knowledge about the countries they work in. However, if NGO personnel became aware that they were being used in this way, it's very likely that many would curtail any future cooperation with the CMOC. It is even possible that such an action could result in international NGOs cutting off any cooperation with the military as a matter of policy.

Even though NGO's activities and projects can serve to reinforce US interests in terms of stabilizing conditions failed or fragmented states, no USG personnel should refer to NGOs as "force multipliers" as suggested by Sweatt,¹⁶ either in internal or external

¹⁵ Swindle, Edward A., "The US Military, NGO's and CMOC: Staying Connected and Achieving Unity of Effort During MOOTW" (US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1999), 15.

¹⁶ Sweatt, Susan, "The Role of Humanitarian Relief Organizations in National Security Strategy" (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001), 13.

communications. Even former Secretary of State Colin Powell used this description when referring to NGOs in widely-published comments. Many NGOs have vehemently expressed their displeasure about being referred to in this fashion. Since it makes them sound as if they are being used as tools of political or military policy, it only reinforces their belief that reconciling their differences with governmental organizations is not possible.¹⁷

To the greatest extent possible, the military should avoid undertaking “hearts and minds” projects or humanitarian relief operations whenever security in an area has been established and NGOs are free to operate in relative safety, unless of course they have requested assistance. By so doing, the military can help to avoid “blurring the lines” between themselves and NGOs, as previously discussed. It will also allow them to better focus on their primary mission - providing stability in still unsecured areas or training host-country military and police organizations to provide these services for themselves.

Military leadership should avoid taking unilateral action during humanitarian relief operations response operations, particularly if NGOs operating in the same area haven’t been informed about them. Ideally, the military should play a supporting role to NGOs (or IGOs) and allow them to lead relief operations when possible, since it’s likely the NGOs will have greater knowledge about how to respond and will remain on the ground long after the military departs.

The military can assist NGOs in responding to humanitarian relief or post-conflict efforts by offering to provide resources that most do not have and cannot possibly afford

¹⁷ Trevor Monroe (State Department Reconstruction Officer in Kabul for two years), interview by author, May 4, 2006, conversation.

to buy. Among the vast array of resources that DoD has available to support NGOs are helicopters, transport planes, sealift, large quantities of all types of staged commodities, medical equipment, building supplies, water-makers and purifiers, fuel and transport services for planes and vehicles, as well as highly trained and motivated personnel who can operate or repair any of the above-mentioned equipment. While NGOs will often not seek assistance from the military for the same reasons discussed above, it should be offered when possible.

Finally, a culture of respect for NGOs needs to be cultivated among military personnel. While many cling to the old stereotypes that NGO staff are “hippies” or “tree-huggers” that wear Birkenstock sandals, in fact many are highly educated professionals with extensive experience in their fields. Some even have prior military service. Many NGO staff employees work overseas in dangerous conditions and war zones for years at a time with very little support or pay. In Afghanistan alone, 41 NGO staff members were killed between January 2003 and May 2005.¹⁸ Despite their sacrifices, it has been reported that NGO personnel were sometimes referred to as “cowards” during a military staff meeting.¹⁹ While incidents like this have, of course, been isolated, it may be an indication that a fundamental misunderstanding exists among less enlightened military personnel regarding who NGOs actually are and how working with them can benefit both the military and USG. Unfortunately, in light of the equally unenlightened, knee-jerk

¹⁸ CARE / Afghanistan National Safety Office, "NGO Insecurity In Afghanistan," http://careusa.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/20050505_ansocare.pdf, CARE USA, May 2005 / (accessed May 2, 2006).

¹⁹ Don Boy (State Department, Kandahar PRT for two years), interview by author, 20 April 2006, conversation.

opposition that some NGO personnel have towards the military, a change in attitude on their part is also necessary.

VII. Conclusion

Many of the challenges associated with humanitarian-military operations...can be overcome if both humanitarian and military actors are willing to work together to identify shared interests and to acknowledge their different organizational cultures²⁰

Despite their very significant differences, the military and NGOs do share several extremely important values. Both organizations have a deep concern for the greater world and their fellow man. They both have great respect for the values of duty and public service and are staffed by highly trained and dedicated professionals who endure long, arduous separations from their homes and families²¹..Given these profound similarities, there must be a way that NGO and military organizations can more closely work together

Some may suggest that better cooperation between the military and NGOs can be achieved by assigning more military liaison officers to JCMOTFs or CMOCs. Others may suggest that cooperation problems can be solved by modifying existing organizational structures or developing and issuing even more joint doctrine. While any of these things could be important by themselves, the most important thing that the military can do to increase cooperation with NGOs is to develop a better understanding of

²⁰ Save The Children UK, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan* (London: Save The Children UK, 2004), 41.

²¹ Holbrooke, Richard, *Civil-Military Relations: Working with NGOs* (InterAction:Washington DC, National Defense University, unknown) [CD-ROM].

their culture and the significant challenges they face in responding to humanitarian emergencies. Simply put, changes made by the military to improve relationships with NGOs must be related to human and cultural factors, rather than being solely organizational.

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